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COMMONWEALTH v. KATER
In Commonwealth v. Kater,l the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts formulated a rule of per se inadmissibility of testi
mony given by a witness who has been hypnotized concerning facts
not recollected before hypnosis. 2 The court held that "hypnosis sim
ply lacks general acceptability by experts in the field as a reliable
method of enhancing the memory of a witness."3 Furthermore, the
court adopted various procedures for assessing the reliability of testi
mony obtained from a witness's prehypnotic memory and for con
ducting hypnotic sessions involving potential witnesses. 4
Kater was tried and convicted of first degree murder and of kid
napping a teenage girts The prosecution obtained the conviction
based upon circumstantial evidence which included hypnotically
aided testimony.6 At trial, the prosecution failed to inform the court
that four of its witnesses had been hypnotized. Believing that two of
the four witnesses had been subjects of hypnosis, the defense counsel
objected to the admissibility of their testimony.1 After a preliminary
examination of the witnesses, the judge decided to admit their
testimony.8
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion for leave to file a mo
tion for a new trial. Upon the recommendation of a single justice,
the supreme judicial court remitted the motion to the trial court to
I. 388 Mass. 519,447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983).
2. Id. at 520, 447 N.E.2d at 1193. It is essential to note that this holding does not
disqualify a witness who has undergone hypnosis from testifying. It allows a witness to
testify as to facts contained in his or her prehypnotic memory but does not permit a
witness to color that testimony with any facts which became "known" as a result of the
hypnotic session. Id. at 529, 447 N.E.2d at 1197.
Hypnotism has been defined as the "production of a sleeplike condition in a person
who is then very susceptible to suggestion and who acts only if told to do so." OXFORD
AMERICAN DICTIONARY 322 (1980).
3. 388 Mass. at 520-21, 447 N.E.2d at 1193.
4. Id. at 529-31,447 N.E.2d at 1197-98.
5. Id. at 520, 447 N.E.2d at 1192.
6. Id. at 522-23, 447 N.E.2d at 1193-94. The Kaler court defined hypnotically
aided testimony as testimony first made available from a witness after hypnosis. Id. at
520, 447 N.E.2d at 1192-93.
7. Id. at 523, 447 N.E.2d at 1194. Sheila Berry and Helena McCoy had been sub
jects of hypnotic sessions twice. Id.
8. Id.
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decide the issue of a new trial. At the hearing on that motion, the
judge declined to establish whether or not the four witnesses had
actually been hypnotized despite the fact that the expert testimony
on hypnosis, offered solely by the defendant, indicated that at least
three of the prosecution's witnesses had been hypnotized. 9 The rec
ord of the trial judge's findings, however, revealed that the hypnotic
sessions were conducted in a haphazard manner-i.e. no record was
kept as to (1) what knowledge each witness possessed prior to hypno
sis, (2) what knowledge the hypnotist possessed about the crime, and
(3) what environment existed prior to and during each session. 1O In
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, the judge stated that
"the defendant failed to establish that the 'hypnotic' sessions devel
oped any additional substantial or material facts or changes in testi
mony and that the testimony of Helena McCoy and Sheila Berry was
the product of their memory as opposed to the product of
hypnosis." II
Many courts have recognized the use of hypnosis for the pur
poses of memory enhancement and investigation in developing evi
dence admissible at trial. I2 These courts have held that hypnosis
affects the credibility, but not the admissibility, of testimony. 13 It is
argued that although a witness's present memory can be impaired by
hypnosis, the dangers of suggestion and confabulation 14 are tem
9. Id. at 524, 447 N.E.2d at 1194. The trial judge doubted that an hypnotic session
occurred since the "hypnotist" was a police officer whose qualifications were almost non
existent. When the police officer attempted to testify that the witnesses were hypnotized,
the judge did not permit him to do so. Id.
10. /d.
II. /d. at 524, 447 N.E.2d at 1194-95.
12. E.g., United States v. Awkward, 597 F.2d 667,669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,444
U.S. 885 (1979); United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198-99 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,439
U.S. 1006 (1978); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281-82 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d
372, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 386, 385
N.E.2d 848, 853-54 (1979); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119,244 S.E.2d 414, 427-28
(1978); State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or. App. 1,8-9,492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971).
13. See cases cited supra note 12.
14. For an explanation of these dangers, see State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 538-39, 432
A.2d 86, 91-93 (1981) (quoting Orne, The Use and Misuse ofHypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L
J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 317-18 (1979».
The hypnotic suggestion to relive a past event, particularly when accompa
nied by questions about specific details, puts pressure on the subject to provide
information for which few, if any, actual memories are available. This situation
may jog the subject's memory and produce some increased recall, but it will
also cause him to fill in details that are plausible but consist of memories or
fantasies from other times. It is extremely difficult to know which aspects of
hypnotically aided recall are historically accurate and which aspects have been
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pered by the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. IS
When confronted for the first time with the question of admissi
bility of hypnotically aided testimony, the supreme judicial court, in
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 16 failed to take a definitive stance on
the issue. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile involved a rape victim who
was initially unable to accurately identify her assailant. 17 After be
ing hypnotized by a Boston police officer, the victim was then able to
assist another detective in sketching a composite picture. This re
sulted in subsequent identifications by the victim and eventual arrest
of the defendant. 18 The absence of certain factual findings l9 by the
trial court concerning the victim's identification testimony and the
possible suggestiveness of the hypnotic session led the court to re
frain from deciding the case and the legal issues contained therein.
The court held, however, that because hypnotically induced testi
confabulated. . . . Subjects will use prior information and cues in an inconsis
tent and unpredictable fashion; in some instances such information is incorpo
rated in what is confabulated, while in others the hypnotic recall may be
virtually unaffected.
As a consequence of these limitations, hypnosis may be useful in some
instances to help bring back forgotten memories following an accident or a
crime while in others a witness might, with the same conviction, produce infor
mation that is totally inaccurate. . .. As long as this material is subject to
independent verification, its utility is considerable and the risk attached to the
procedure is minimal. There is no way, however, by which anyone--even a
psychologist or psychiatrist with extensive training in the field of hypnosis--..:can
for any particular piece of information determine whether it is an actual mem
ory versus a confabulation unless there is independent verification.
Id. (emphasis in original). See generally Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use ofPre
trial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313 (1980); Specter & Foster,
Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible? 38 OHIO ST.
L.J. 567 (1977).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1006 (1978) (the prosecution impeached a defense witness with his post-hypnotic
statements); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 120-21,244 S.E.2d 414, 428 (1978) (failure to
cross-examine witness who had undergone hypnosis removed the defense's chance to
render the witness's testimony inadmissible or discredited); State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or.
App. 1,8-9,492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971) (fact that witness had been subjected to hypnosis
and administration of sodium amy tal found not to be a basis for disallowing testimony
since the witness underwent prolonged and rigorous cross-examination by defense coun
sel before the jury). But see Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981) (over
turning Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1967), cert. denied, 252 Md. 731,
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969) which ~epresented the leading opinion that fact of hyp
nosis affects credibility and weight, not admissibility).
16. 381 Mass. 727, 412 N.E.2d 339 (1980).
17. Id. at 728, 412 N.E.2d at 340.
18. /d.
19. The police officer who hypnotized the victim did not record the session nor the
victim's pre-hypnotic memory. There was also controversy regarding whether or not the
other policeman who assembled the composite picture knew the defendant. Id.
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mony is inherently suggestive and because the surrounding circum
stances of the hypnotic session are within the knowledge of the
Commonwealth, the admissibility of such testimony should be con
ditioned upon a showing by the Commonwealth of its reliability.20
In applying Commonwealth v. A Juvenile to the procedural facts of
Kater ,21 the supreme judicial court interpreted the trial judge's deci
sion as having misplaced the burden of proof placed upon the de
fense in that it required the defense to demonstrate that the
hypnotically aided testimony proffered by the prosecution was
reliable. 22
Having resolved the burden of proof issue, the supreme judicial
court in Kater sought to establish a standard for determining the ad
missibility of such evidence. The supreme judicial court had stated
in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile that it would consider adopting a
modified version of the test used in Frye v. United States 23 to ascer
tain the admissibility of any expert testimony based upon scientific
principles or techniques. 24 The Frye test provides that admission of
such evidence is contingent upon whether the scientific principle or
technique employed "is sufficiently established to have gained gen
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."25 In
adopting this test, the Kater court did not attempt to analogize hyp
nosis to other conventional scientific processes,26 but rather the court
found the evidentiary reasoning underlying the Frye test to apply to
the situation at hand.27 The Kater court reasoned that when the situ
ation is such that the jurors cannot realistically evaluate a principle
or process because it is outside their realm of common knowledge or
experience, the assistance of expert testimony is essential to their for
mulation of an informed decision. 28 Consequently, the party who is
the proponent of hypnotically induced testimony must show that
20. Id. at 734, 412 N.E.2d at 344.
21. Although the holding of Commonwealth v. A Juvenile was in effect, the trial
judge in Kater failed to apply it.
22. Kater, 388 Mass. at 524, 447 N.E.2d at 1195.
23. 293 F. 10\3 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
24. 381 Mass. at 732, 412 N.E.2d at 342-43.
25. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
26. The prosecution attempted to argue that the Frye test should not apply to hyp
nosis cases because Frye deals only with psychological or physiological scientific
processes.
27. 388 Mass. at 526, 447 N.E.2d at 1195.
28. The court did not explicitly state this proposition; however, when reading the
reasoning behind the Frye test in conjunction with the Kater court's concern for whether
a jury "can realistically evaluate the effect of hypnosis," one is lead to this conclusion.
/d. at 526, 447 N.E.2d at 1195-96.
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there exists general acceptance among experts depicting hypnosis as
a reliable means of refreshing recall. 29 In light of the general
skeptcisim among experts 30 as to the reliability of such testimony,
the Kater court ruled that testimony induced by hypnosis is
inadmissible. 31
While the court held that hypnotically aided testimony was
inadmissible, the court's holding did not preclude a witness from tes
tifying as to facts remembered before hypnosis. 32 In order to pre
serve a witness's prehypnotic testimony, the court set forth the
following procedural safeguards to be applied flexibly:
The hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed psy
chiatrist or psychologist trained in the use of hypnosis. 33
(2) The qualified professional conducting the hypnotic session
should be independent of and not responsible to the prosecu
tor, investigator or the defense.
(3) Any information given to the hypnotic session must be in
written form so that subsequently the extent of the informa
tion the subject received from the hypnotist may be
determined.
(4) Before induction of hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain
(1)

29. Id. at 527,447 N.E.2d at 1196. A few courts have adopted the Frye approach
as requiring each party to offer expert testimony on the effects of hypnosis in each partic
ular case. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 538, 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981) (hypnosis satisfies
Frye in certain instances). For a thorough analysis of the Hurd interpretation see Note,
Safeguarding Admissibility afHypnotically Enhanced Testimony, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
281 (1982); see also State v. Beacham, 97 N. M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981)
(post-hypnotic recollections admissible when proper foundation has first established the
reliability of hypnotic session).
30. The Kater court declined to cite the opinions of many experts concluding that
hypnotically aided testimony is unreliable. The court did however mention the inherent
dangers associated with hypnosis as expressed by Dr. Orne, see supra note 14, adding
that previously hypnotized witnesses have a tendency to be immune from meaningful
cross-examination. 388 Mass. at 528, 447 N.E.2d at 1196.
31. 388 Mass. at 527-28, 447 N.E.2d 1196-97. Most of the courts which have re
cently held hypnotically induced testimony inadmissible have interpreted the Frye stan
dard in this manner. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768-71 (Minn. 1980);
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18,40,641 P.2d 775, 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 255-56, cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 13 (1982); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 542-44, 453 N.E.2d 484,
494-95, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 265-66 (1983).
32. 388 Mass. at 528-29, 447 N.E.2d at 1197. The court recognized two situations
in which it would not find evidence procured through the use of hypnosis inadmissible:
I) where a person suffers loss of memory due to a physical trauma; and 2) where the
evidence is discovered as a result of the hypnotism of a witness. Id. at 528-29 n.6, 447
N.E.2d at 1197 n.6.
33. The Kater court recognized that there may be situations when an individual
qualified in the use of hypnosis would suffice. 388 Mass. at 530 n.8, 447 N.E.2d at 1198
n.8.
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from the subject a detailed description of the facts as the sub
ject remembers them, carefully avoiding adding any new ele
ments to the witness's description of the events.
All contacts between the hypnotist and the subject should be
recorded so that a permanent record is available for compari
son and study to establish that the witness has not received
information or suggestion which might later be reported as
having been first described by the subject during hypnosis.
Videotape should be employed if possible, but should not be
mandatory.
Only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during
any phase of the hypnotic session, including the prehypnotic
testing and post-hypnotic interview.
Opposing counsel must raise a timely objection to the intro
duction of testimony procured through hypnosis.
Opposing counsel must be given an opportunity to show the
possible effects of hypnosis and the way in which the particu
lar session was conducted on the witness's testimony and
sense of certainty.
Opposing counsel must be entitled to an instruction to the
jury that in assessing the credibility of any such witness they
may consider the consequences of (a) the fact that a witness
underwent questioning while hypnotized and (b) the circum
stances under which the hypnotic session was conducted. 34

In developing these guidelines, the court acknowledged that the
decision would have a deterrent effect on the use of hypnosis for the
purposes of developing testimony against a criminal defendant. 35
The court emphasized, however, that its decision was based upon the
scientific community's present lack of conclusive evidence with re
gard to the reliability of hypnosis as a memory stimulant. 36 Byex
cluding only the testimony which is hypnotically induced, the court
safeguarded the instrumental role hypnosis might play in the investi
gative process.
Patricia J. Nowak

34. The first six guidelines can be found in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 381 Mass.
at 732, 412 N.E.2d at 343. The last three can be found in Kater, 388 Mass. at 530-31, 447
N.E.2d at 1198.
35. Kater, 388 Mass. at 531, 447 N.E.2d at 1199.
36. Id.

